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Workers' Group

THE IMPACT OF ANTI-CRISIS MEASURES, AND THE SOCIAL AND EMPLOYMENT SITUATION

SPAIN

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1. Introduction

Two periods can be identified in Spain's efforts to tackle the crisis. During the first period, the fundamental concern guiding the legislative response was to tackle the acute employment crisis resulting from the widespread losses of jobs, with a particular impact on the construction sector and on sectors dependent on the real estate sector. Social agreement, including wage restraint, the extension of social protection to unemployment situations and incentives for stable employment contracts were the focus of public authorities' action from 2009 to May 2010. With ongoing job losses and the declining confidence of the financial markets in the solvency of the Spanish State, there was a dramatic turnaround coinciding with the outbreak of the Greek crisis. The economic measures being implemented in Spain since May 2010 comprise a highly varied raft of measures focussing on reducing the public deficit as the only way to put an end to the economic recession. This powerful tendency reached its peak in September 2011, when Article 135 of the constitutional text was reformed to impose the principle of bringing public authorities' spending into line with the public debt limit laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

According to the European Commission and the institutions regulating the financial markets, such as the ECB and the IMF, economic measures aimed at reducing public deficit should be accompanied by government action to impose in-depth "structural reforms" of Spanish legislation, which meant carrying out a series of reforms relating to labour relations, the social security system and collective bargaining, with the express aim of creating and/or maintaining jobs. In other words, while State macroeconomic action has tended towards reducing public deficit, and hence the contraction of the public sector, efforts to maintain and create jobs have been restricted to revising the regulation of labour relations and social protection systems. Two main lines of action have therefore emerged.

The first relates to the "inevitable" nature of austerity measures and public deficit reduction as the only way to exit the crisis and to achieve economic recovery. The political and economic debate has therefore moved away from issues such as changing the production model and the reforms needed in the field of business with a view to strengthening economic activity, which over recent decades has been almost entirely based on the real estate sector, with a spiral of speculation and rising prices in residential property. Absolving economic and business actors of their responsibilities in this way, through the implementation of policies to reduce public spending, has recently been criticised as having depressive effects on the so-called real economy³.

The second line of action, which reflects the first, is closely related to the reforms carried out in labour relations, led by the arguable principle that jobs can only be created or maintained by reducing legal and political employment guarantees and reducing average pay standards and working conditions, setting job creation against robust employment rights. This view, which is nothing new in Spain, has not been shown to be correct, either in the current crisis or in previous crises such as those in the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, during 2009-2011, there has been an intense process of reform, from both qualitative and quantitative points of view, which sees employment rights as the main cause of legislative rigidity and hence job destruction.

As an early result of this combination of macroeconomic and microeconomic policies, Spain has now taken a huge step backwards in terms of the distribution of wealth⁴, directly related to the situation of progressive unemployment, the reduction in social spending and the contraction of

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³ J. GUAJARDO, D. LEIGH and A. PESCATORI, *Expansionary Austerity: New International Evidence*. IMF Working Papers, 11/158.

⁴ OECD, *Divided we stand. Why inequality keeps rising?* OECD Publishing, 2011.

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public services, when between the 1980s and 2008, Spain had reduced that gap by more than the countries of the OECD.

2. Economic measures aimed at reducing the public deficit

Public deficit reduction measures have been introduced progressively since 2010, with particular emphasis on cutting spending within the different public authorities. As we shall see later, this does not mean that no decision has been adopted affecting revenue, but the majority of legislative work has focussed on the restructuring of public authorities' staffing costs, reducing public deficit and policies based on reducing social spending and the privatisation of public services within the particular structure of the State and the Autonomous Regions. Before discussing these measures, it is crucial to analyse two factors which provide the background for assessing the impact of this unequal series of actions.

Firstly, we should consider the specific weight and size of the public sector in Spain in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), on the one hand, and in relation to the redistribution and levelling-out role it plays through social spending, on the other. The public sector represented 40.4% of GDP in 2008⁵. However, compared to the dominant pattern in the European Union, the Spanish public sector is modest in size and is highly decentralised. In 2007, public spending in Spain stood at 38.6% compared to the 46.9% EU-25 average⁶, but this difference has not prevented the dynamism of public revenue through a progressive increase in the tax burden. Social spending is lower than the EU-25 average, but it has played an equalising or levelling role with regard to sectors of the population with lower incomes, since it has represented just over half of the State General Budget. By size, social spending at that time covered contributory and non-contributory pensions, unemployment benefits, family protection by means of maternity and paternity leave⁷, social services and social promotion, assistance for dependent persons, education and access to housing.

With regard to the decentralised territorial structure in terms of spending and revenue, it should be stressed that, since 2001, there has been very significant progress in the process of decentralising policies from the State to the Autonomous Regions, which has considerably altered the territorial structure of public spending and revenue, making the Spanish public sector one of the most decentralised in Europe. In 1998, distribution of public spending amongst the central, autonomous and local levels was 71%, 16% and 13% respectively, while in 2007 it stood at 53%, 33% and 14%. Following the transfer of education and health powers to the Autonomous Regions, the degree of decentralisation is particularly high in terms of spending, but, despite the gradual quantitative and qualitative extension of fiscal powers from the State to the Autonomous Regions, the degree of decentralisation in terms of revenue is much lower⁸. The effects of this situation are currently being felt in terms of the shape of the public deficit.

Having stressed the significance of the public sector in Spain, we would mention the measures aimed at reducing public spending as an anti-crisis strategy. These fall into two stages, corresponding to governments of differing political colours but which clearly have the same aims.

Royal Decree-Law No 8/2010, of 20 May, adopting extraordinary measures to reduce the public deficit, introduced a series of actions aimed at controlling the public deficit resulting from the serious economic and financial crisis. The main measures under this regulation were:

- Suspension of the adjustment of pensions for 2011, except for minimum pensions and non-contributory pensions.
- Reduction in the salaries of public employees by an average of 5%, from 1 June 2010 to December 2011⁹.
- Change to the time limit for the granting of care benefit to six months from its request.
- Removal of the tax deduction for birth or adoption from personal income tax.

⁵ Eurostat data, 2007.

⁶ 2007 has been chosen in order not to reflect distortions resulting from the crisis and the measures adopted subsequently in order to correct it.

⁷ On the entry into force of Organic Law 3/2007, of 15 March, on equality between men and women.

⁸ ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, *Report on the socio-economic and employment situation in Spain 2007*. Madrid, 2008.

⁹ This is when the *Partido Popular* government, by means of RD-Law 20/2011, of 30 December, on urgent budgetary, fiscal and financial measures to reduce the public deficit, reduced the salaries of public employees.

- Removal of the single payment birth and adoption grant from social security.
- A delay in the economic and financial actions of local authorities.

Of these measures, we would draw attention to the salary reduction for public employees, given its impact in legal and socio-employment terms.

In legal terms, the reduction in the salaries of public employees led to an ongoing legal debate on the power of the Royal Decree-Law to amend both the Law on General State Budgets of 2010 and, crucially, the binding nature of the "statutory collective agreement" of a general scope governing labour relations for workers in public authorities and public companies. The said emergency regulation directly contravened the *Acuerdo Gobierno-Sindicatos para la función pública en el marco del Diálogo Social (2010-2012)* [Government-trade union agreement on public employees in the framework of social dialogue], which, a few months before, had set salary tables, taking account of the crisis under way, and as a result of this contravention, all of the collective agreements for staff working for the different administrations were affected.

RD-Law 13/2010, of 17 September, on fiscal, employment and liberalisation actions to promote investment and job creation, introduced changes to company tax with the aim of creating employment. That regulation's most significant measures were, on the one hand, to no longer require the obligatory documentation from bodies and persons whose gross turnover during the tax period was less than ten million euros, and the reduction in the tax rate for bodies with a turnover of no more than EUR 300 000. Hence, taxable amounts of between 0 and EUR 120 202.41 are taxed at 20%, while the remaining taxable amounts up to EUR 300 000, on the basis of this regulation, will be taxed at 25%. Bodies with a turnover above this latter figure will be taxed at 30%. Furthermore, this regulation provided for the creation of a State business undertaking called *Aena Aeropuertos, S.A.*, the share capital of which will initially correspond to the public body *Aeropuertos Españoles y Navegación Aérea* – AENA, but subsequently it may be sold, though 51% of the undertaking's share capital must be maintained. In other words, in September 2010, 49% of the share capital of the previously public body AENA was privatised¹⁰. Similarly, RD-Law 13/2010 provided for the reorganisation of State lottery and gambling activities, creating the *Sociedad Estatal de Loterías y Apuestas*, and deregistering the previous public corporation *Loterías y Apuestas del Estado*¹¹. Officials in service employed within that public corporation were given the opportunity, from the date of the entry into force of this regulation, to become staff of the new State company.

RD-Law 8/2011, of 1 July, on measures to support mortgage holders, the control of public spending and the cancellation of debts owed to companies and self-employed workers contracted by local authorities, to stimulate business activity and to promote administrative simplification and reorganisation, introduced the significant rule requiring the spending of public administrations and local authorities to be in line with the medium-term growth of the Spanish economy, defined as GDP growth, expressed in nominal terms, over a reference period of nine years. Furthermore, this regulation introduced the possibility of cancelling the debts owed by local authorities, their independent bodies or bodies under their responsibility, to companies and self-employed workers, resulting from the acquisition of supplies, the carrying out of works or the provision of services by means of long-term credit operations. Finally, this regulation dealt with taxation, as a means to promote business activity, by modifying personal income tax, company taxes, tax on the income of non-residents and property tax.

After the summer, and in the face of persistently low market confidence, the government was again urged by the ECB to continue the policy of reforms under way. Thus, on 27 September 2011, by means of a political pact with the *Partido Popular* [People's Party], the government was able to reform Article 135 of the Constitution to promote budgetary balance, thereby establishing that all public authorities would bring their actions into line with the principle of budgetary stability, including amongst the spending to be taken into account, that relating to credits for the payment of public-debt interest and capital, making their payment an absolute priority. This constitutional reform places the emphasis on the control of public deficit without establishing a parallel general clause on respect for the social State, which relates in particular to urgent situations such as unemployment.

The prohibition of public deficit laid down in the Constitution has been criticised for placing Spain in a permanent position of inequality, in an asymmetric balance in terms of European "governance". Counter-cyclical investments and maintaining the social State at times when its funding is

¹⁰ Despite the fact that to date, 49% of the share capital has not been allocated.

¹¹ However, that privatisation is temporarily suspended.

insufficient may require indebtedness, and therefore for there to be a deficit in years when the debt incurred in order to fund these social investments is being repaid. Other EU Member States can deal with this situation, but not Spain. Furthermore, having laid down a general and absolute prohibition of indebtedness for all State bodies and administrations beyond a certain percentage of GDP to be set by an organic law, much of the public policy action on equality and social levelling under the social clause in Article 1(1) of the Spanish Constitution is becoming impossible, despite the fact that Article 9(2) of the same constitutional text obliges public authorities to work constantly to eliminate situations of economic, social and cultural inequality which divide and fragment a country's citizens.

The most recent measure adopted to limit and contain the public deficit has been RD-Law 20/2011, of 30 December, on urgent budgetary, fiscal and financial measures to reduce the public deficit, which was adopted by another government, the *Partido Popular* government, but which maintains the approach of the previous government. This regulation provides, on the one hand, for a cut in spending of EUR 8 900 million and, on the other, income of EUR 6 275 million, through an increase in the public deficit to 8%, initially forecast at 6% for 2011 and at 4.4% in 2012. This increase in the public deficit appears to originate from the budgets of the different Autonomous Regions.

Below is a summary of the main measures, firstly measures to reduce spending and then the measures to boost revenue. In terms of spending, the regulation provides for:

- The extension of the reduction in the salary of public employees initially laid down until December 2011. Generally speaking, this measure will lead to a 12% drop in the purchasing power of public employees' salaries, implying a price evolution similar to that experienced in 2011.
- The replacement rate for civil servants is fixed at 0%, except for teaching staff, national health system centres and hospitals, armed forces and law-enforcement agencies, for which the replacement rate may be up to 10%.
- The increase in the working day for public employees to 37.5 hours per week. It should be stressed here that both civil servants and the staff of the General State Administration had already been working 37.5 hours per week prior to this measure. With regard to the Autonomous Regions and Local Authorities, it should be remembered that since working time is not subject to a basic rule in employment legislation, a regulation of this kind is needed so that such a measure is applicable to regional authorities. The same is true of certain public bodies in which the working day is set by means of statutory collective bargaining. In this case, there will be a conflict relating to the binding nature of the collective agreement and, ultimately, the right to trade union freedom.
- The freeze of the national minimum wage, which will therefore remain at EUR 641.40 per month.
- The introduction of a one-year moratorium on the inclusion of new beneficiaries in the system for persons in situations of moderate dependency.
- A 20% reduction in the subsidies for political parties, trade unions and trade union organisations.
- The elimination of EUR 200 million of the subsidy for commercial gas oil.

In relation to revenue, the government has adopted the following measures:

- The advance on the payment by instalment of corporate tax for large companies is maintained, having originally been adopted in August 2011.
- For personal income tax, the creation of a provisional and progressive tax in 2012 and 2013, on the sum taxable at national level. The rate increases progressively from 0.75%, for a taxable sum from 0, to 7% for income of a national taxable sum of over EUR 300 000.
- A supplementary levy is laid down on capital income, for 2012 and 2013, at percentages ranging from 2% for yields of up to EUR 6 000, 4% between EUR 6 000 and EUR 24 000, and 6% for yields of over EUR 24 000.
- A complementary increase in the tax on immovable property, with transitional arrangements for 2012 and 2013, at three rates, 10, 6 and 4%, according to the time elapsed since the review of cadastral value. The longer that time, the greater the rise.

3. "Structural" reforms of legal origin regarding employment relations

There has been a long process of labour reform in Spain which has not necessarily been linear, with moments of open social conflict when opportunities for cooperation and dialogue have broken down, mixed with moments of negotiation and even agreement such as those in January and February 2011, which continued with the negotiation with the *CEOE* [Spanish confederation of

businesses] of the legal reform of collective bargaining and the search for compromises in order to conclude the collective agreements still awaiting renegotiation from 2010.

In general terms, this non-linear reform process can be characterised by the aforementioned tendency to oppose job creation and the employment rights standards in force in the Spanish State. It is not related to the European objective of "flexicurity" since, taken to its fullest extent, maximum "flexibility" would correspond to an increase in "security", something which runs counter to the idea of restricting public spending. The idea underlying these reforms, therefore, is that maintaining jobs and reducing their destruction should be achieved by reducing or removing labour rights or downgrading the system of employment safeguards. There has been convincing criticism of this approach on the grounds that it erodes European social models which are guaranteed constitutionally, such as the Spanish model, in which growth, development and employment should be accompanied by the consolidation of a full range of individual and collective rights.

There is also an alternative version of this argument, which stresses the temporary nature of these unequal exchanges and the possibility of their being controlled. In other words, a short temporary stage of restricting rights in which the social partners must participate by means of tripartite social agreement mechanisms. It does not therefore deny the central element that job creation directly relates to making dismissal cheaper and easier, an increase in the unilateral nature of productive reorganisation and the freedom to select atypical kinds of contract for joining a company, but intends that to be administered with the participation of trade unions and employers' organisations.

Finally, before discussing the legislative measures introduced in the field of labour relations, we would point out the tendency shown by both the Socialist Party government and now the *Partido Popular* government in relation to the scope and procedures for the successive labour reforms. That is, the call from the political authorities for social dialogue as the preferred means for carrying out labour reforms, while warning the social partners of two situations. The first is that an agreement on reform must be reached within a certain period of time. The second is that, if an agreement is not reached, the labour reform will be introduced by the government, which raises the possibility of a draft reform which upsets the negotiations by proposing a deregulation of the legislative framework. This is what happened in the case of the reform under RD-Law 10/2010 on the legal reform of collective bargaining and it may happen in the current process of social dialogue which should conclude at the end of January 2012. This approach from the political authorities, taken by both the Socialist government and the *Partido Popular* government, has had a negative impact by calling into question the role played by trade unions as collective representative of workers' interests. The Spanish trade union movement is therefore obliged to manage carefully its capacity to mobilise – of which the calling of the general strike in September 2011 was a good example – as well as its institutional presence in social dialogue and collective bargaining.

Of the "structural reforms" of labour relations advocated by the European Union, we would stress the areas in which there has been noticeable change: contracts, internal flexibility and redundancy for economic, technical, organisational and productive reasons. The content of these reforms is analysed below.

A) **Contracts:**

In terms of contracts, the reforms introduced over the last two years followed an intense debate on one of the peculiarities of the Spanish labour market: the high rate of temporary employment. This atypical feature, which has been in place since the end of the 1980s, reached 34.8% in 2006. This weakness of the Spanish market is one of the factors explaining the extremely rapid and widespread destruction of jobs seen during the first two years of the economic and financial crisis (see table in the annex). Therefore, during the first stage of reforms, the imposition of certain legal controls of temporary contracts was promoted, taking an approach which was somewhat traditional in Spanish legislation and which had been reinforced before the crisis, in the reform of 2006, the result of dialogue between the social actors. However, there was a second stage during which this trend was reversed, as we shall see below.

Firstly, limits were introduced on the duration of the "contract for project work or services" (Article 15(1)(a) of the Workers' Statute), which, prior to the reform, while it covered a temporary period, was uncertain, since the duration of the contract was dependent upon the completion of the work or service in question. Article 1(a) of Law 35/2010, of 17 September, established a duration of no more than three years, extendable by a further twelve months by a nationwide sectoral collective agreement or, in the absence thereof, by a sectoral collective agreement of a more limited scope.

Secondly, Law 35/2010 attempted to improve the wording of the existing clause on successive temporary contracts with a particular worker, taking account of contracts with a particular worker within a particular time period. Hence, "Employees who are hired for more than 24 months on a temporary basis within a 30 month-period, with or without interruption, with two or more temporary contracts, directly or through temporary employment agencies, in the same or different position of the same Company or group of companies, should be hired for an indefinite term [...]". It will be applicable in the event of company subrogation or succession in accordance with the relevant legislation or agreements.

However, contrary to this, Article 5 of RD-Law 10/2011, of 26 August, on urgent measures to promote the employment of young people, on promoting employment stability and on maintaining the vocational retraining programme for people no longer eligible for unemployment benefit, provides for the temporary suspension of these measures to prevent the fraudulent use of successive temporary contracts for a period of two years, thereby reversing the effect, just one year after its adoption, of the improvement which was intended partially to provide stable employment for workers with successive temporary contracts with the same company.

Furthermore, Law 35/2010, of 17 September, improved the temporary contract severance payment through a progressive annual increase in that payment from eight days of salary for each year of service for temporary contracts dated before 31 December 2011 to twelve days of salary for contracts dated from 1 January 2015.

However, the aforementioned RDL 10/2011 of 26 August provides for a vocational training contract with a maximum reduction of the training element, low salaries (75% of the minimum wage) and exemption from social security contributions during the period of the contracts. For two years, it is possible to employ young people of between 16 and 30 with no professional qualifications in this way.

B) Internal flexibility:

Internal flexibility is a crucial instrument in terms of reducing unemployment and increasing productivity in the Spanish economy, as stated in Law 35/2010. This conclusion reached by the legislator in 2010 is not very different from the conclusion which had been reached by the social partners through social dialogue in the successive interconfederal collective bargaining agreements which have taken place within the legal system since 1997. The establishment and development of a certain model of internal flexibility can bring beneficial effects which meet the needs both of employers and of workers, making it possible to adapt working conditions, working times and salaries quickly to the changing demands of the markets in which a particular company is operating and, as result, avoiding external flexibility, temporary contracts and redundancy, as mechanisms for adjusting to certain company needs.

However, Law 35/2010 differs from the interconfederal collective bargaining agreements in terms of its view of where internal flexibility should be introduced. While the interconfederal agreements have taken the view that this kind of flexible regulation should take place within the context of sectoral collective bargaining, introducing a series of rules to govern the whole production industry according to the internal flexibility needs of the sector, Law 35/2010 has left the decision on the introduction of internal flexibility to the will of the employer, via company-level agreements to be reached with workers' representatives at that level, taking this role away from collective bargaining. The reform of September 2010 therefore means a general absence of application, at company level, of provisions laid down at sectoral level.

Generally speaking, this internal flexibility model has a series of effects which have been criticised for their impact on the governance of labour relations via collective bargaining. This model involves the progressive establishment of working conditions at the level of companies or workplaces, which prevents the use of internal flexibility measures from being extended to the production sector as a whole and reduces the capacity of collective parties to regulate working conditions, with a particular negative impact on job stability, health and safety at work and the reconciliation of family, personal and working lives.

C) Dismissal for economic, technical, organisational or productive reasons:

The final area of great importance amongst the structural legal reforms regarding labour relations is that relating to dismissal for economic, technical, organisational or productive reasons.

The reasons for the reform of dismissal are given in the Preamble to Law 35/2010, with a key objective: to rectify the dysfunctionality over recent years of many terminations of indefinite contracts, which in reality are based on economic or productive reasons, being classed as unjustified disciplinary dismissals. This situation, which Law 35/2010 is intended to rectify, originates from the labour reform of 2002, which, amongst other things, modified the effects of dismissal on disciplinary grounds which has been declared unjustified (Article 56(2) of the Workers' Statute). The legislator introduced the possibility for the employer to acknowledge in the same formal act of dismissal on disciplinary grounds the unjustified nature of that dismissal, providing the worker with the relevant compensation, and thereby avoiding salaries from the time of dismissal to the time the court declares it unjustified. Beyond the specific evaluation of this type of dismissal governed from the outside, that reform has led to a phenomenon known as "*express*" dismissal on disciplinary grounds, in which employers make use of this type of dismissal irrespective of the true reason for it.

This objective of the 2010 reform of reinforcing the reasons for the termination of employment contracts, ensuring that the true reasons for the termination are given, raises the issue of the conduct of companies prior to the reform with regard to the choice of the type of dismissal. Far from seeking a legislative means to ensure that the classification of the dismissal reflects the true reason for the dismissal, the legislator ignored this fraudulent behaviour in 2010, insisting on the legal fiction that companies are free to dismiss workers in an unjustified or groundless manner, provided that the worker receives their corresponding compensation, reducing the act of dismissal to a mere economic transaction and absolving the company of any responsibility for their illegal action.

The responsibility of companies has been further reduced in Law 35/2010, which interprets the illegal conduct of employers as merely a dysfunction of employment legislation, which must therefore be corrected in order to provide greater certainty for workers, employers and courts in their judicial control function.

This legislative option can disguise the fraud committed by employers over recent years in relation to dismissal, the true motivation for which has been the inconvenience for the employer of a court being able to control its decision to dismiss. It should be noted that *express* dismissal on disciplinary grounds (unjustified), in application of Article 56(2) of the Workers' Statute, was not the cheapest option in terms of the cost of compensation, despite the saving in salaries during the processing period, but rather the quickest, by *de facto* avoiding judicial control of the dismissal.

With regard to the instruments provided by the legislator to promote greater *certainty* for workers, employers and courts, we would draw attention to an important aspect which has had the direct result of persuading employers to replace the use of dismissal on disciplinary grounds with that of objective dismissal¹².

This aspect relates to the new wording of the economic, technical, organisational or productive reasons for dismissal which, *a priori*, considerably increases employers' ability to use dismissal as a further organisational strategy in order to improve their competitive position in the market or respond better to the requirements of demand, overshadowing and contradicting the 2010 legislation regarding internal flexibility as a mechanism for maintaining and creating jobs.

4. Action regarding conditions for receiving social security benefits

The call for a general strike on 29 September 2010 from Spain's most representative trade union organisations, *Comisiones Obreras* and *Unión General de Trabajadores*, the central focus of which was a rejection of a labour reform (Law 35/2010, of 17 September) which reduced employment rights and contributed to the destruction of jobs, as time has shown, and the mobilisations and demands which led on from that strike, resulted in the restoration of social dialogue at a particularly important time when the government's roadmap of reforms was dealing with the reform of the public pension system. In February 2011, the social and economic agreement for growth, employment and pension guarantees was signed, which would eventually lead to the current Law 27/2011, of 1 August, on the updating, adaptation and modernisation of the social security system.

The *need* for the reform was propounded in the European Commission's documents on the modernisation of public social security systems, since the Spanish system at that time – like the current system – showed a surplus, despite the widespread destruction of jobs. The reform could

¹² The statistics provided by the Public Employment Service show that workers' access to contributory benefits resulting from disciplinary dismissal has dropped by 16%, while access to contributory benefits resulting from objective dismissal under Article 52(c) of the Workers' Statute and the labour force adjustment plan leading to dismissals has risen by 48.1% and 37.9%, respectively (http://www.mtin.es/estadisticas/BEL/PRD/prd15_top_HTML.htm).

not therefore be presented simply as another measure to reduce the public deficit, but rather it was argued that the reform was needed for the sake of future sustainability in the short term (2029) and as one of the endless attempts to restore the confidence of international markets.

In the Spanish legal system, the public social security system is based on the principle of inter-generational solidarity, which breaks the link between contributions to the single social security fund and the benefits received. In the case of retirement pensions, that principle means that active workers are covering the costs of the pensions of workers who have become eligible for a retirement pension.

Furthermore, compared to other legal systems, the Spanish contributory social security system is funded by means of contributions relating to work, from both employers and workers (Article 86(2) of the General Law on Social Security). Non-contributory benefits, healthcare, except when work-related, social services, family benefits, supplements for contributory pensions which are below the minimum level, and non-contributory maternity benefits are funded from the General State Budgets (Article 86(2) of the General Law on Social Security).

Given this general nature of the Spanish system, it was particularly notable that the reform of the social security system should be limited to contributory pensions, despite the fact that its reform would also affect other benefits such as permanent disability benefits, unemployment benefits etc..

The reform's central idea was to reduce the costs of contributory retirement pensions, by restricting expenditure, and the measures focussing on revenue are too insignificant and routine to mention.

The most significant changes to the contributory retirement pension can be summarised in the two following points:

- Raising of the normal pensionable age from 65 years to 67 years, progressively from 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2027, unless by 65 years the person has contributed for 38.5 years. The years of contribution required from the entry into force of Law 27/2011 (1 January 2013), will be applied progressively, increasing by 3 months of contribution per year up to the aforementioned 38.5 years.
- Increase in the years of contribution for the calculation of the base for the retirement pension, from 15 to 25 years. This means that, in calculating the pension, the last 25 years will be taken into account, which will usually mean lower pensions, since workers' salaries are generally lower during the early years of their working lives than in the later years.

In short, the public system of contributory retirement pensions has generally been downgraded, although in the future this will lead to a 10% total saving compared to current pensions. In particular, this reform has had the most harmful effect on female workers of a particular generation, who were obliged to withdraw from working life when getting married, or other younger female workers who decide – or are obliged – to work part-time.

5. Reform of the legal system for collective bargaining

Another of the declared objectives of the "structural reform" plan demanded by the ECB in order to restore market confidence was the reform of collective bargaining. In Spain, this issue has traditionally been determined jointly by the social partners, which in successive interprofessional agreements have defined the structure of the negotiation and the organisation of its content. With the crisis, this principle of autonomous collective competence broke down when no agreement was reached between the social partners and this task was replaced by public intervention, by means of RD-Law 7/2011, of 10 June, on urgent measures to reform collective bargaining.

It has not yet been possible to assess the impact of the content of the legislative text, the significant measures of which we shall discuss below, since the collective agreements which could have been affected had already been re-negotiated. However, the measures introduced are long-term measures. Essentially, collective bargaining is promoted at company level beyond the aspects already regulated and not applied concerning specific aspects of the sectoral agreement on salaries or working time through the conclusion of a company-level agreement for economic, technical or productive reasons. The additional element of the reform is intended to promote the preferential use of company-level agreements over sectoral agreements, except when prohibited by competition rules or by the terms of an agreement. The regulation provides for:

– Priority to be given to the regulation of certain working conditions agreed in the collective agreement at company level, such as the amount of the basic salary and wage supplements; payment or compensation for over-time and specific payment for shift work; the hours and the distribution of the working day; professional classification; measures for reconciling personal, family and working lives. Prior to the reform, collective sectoral agreements were the preferred form of collective bargaining, and the legislation allows an interprofessional agreement or a collective sectoral agreement to establish different competition rules or organisation of the contents.

– The list of issues forming the minimum content of the collective agreement is increased significantly, while at the same time the freedom of the collective parties to decide the content of the text is reduced.

– A restriction of the time period a collective agreement can remain in force after it has expired, by setting a maximum negotiation period according to the time in force of the agreement, establishing an obligatory system of arbitration for times when the negotiation of the collective agreement is in deadlock, which was previously decided by the collective parties who had provided for it during the said collective bargaining. This is intended to restrict the time period during which, once an agreement has elapsed, its provisions can remain in force until a new text is agreed.

These new rules will apply to the collective bargaining of 2012, but it is too early to assess their specific effects.

6. Final comments

The anti-crisis measures in Spain have taken an economic policy approach focussing on the priority – almost sole – objective of reducing the public deficit, which has been accompanied by a context of social conflict linked essentially to the extremely rapid and widespread destruction of jobs (EPA-18 and EPA-19), with the unemployment rate now standing at 22.9%. In July 2008, the unemployment rate stood at 11.3%. Or to put it another way, some 3 million jobs have been destroyed between July 2008 and January 2012. The situation is all the more acute if we consider the proportion of long-term unemployed workers, who account for 40% of all the unemployed (EPA-22), meaning that the long-term unemployment rate stands at 8.6%, the third highest in the European Union. Unemployment is distributed by age in a highly uneven manner, having its greatest effect on young workers (EPA-24).

Despite the explicit intentions of the public authorities, it appears that the structural measures to reform the labour market have had no real impact in terms of changing the situation of the labour market, in which unemployment is still extremely widespread. The new government appears to want to continue with the same anti-crisis policies, despite the fact that the Spanish economy has shown no signs of recovery for at least two years, as pointed out by economic commentators and financial intermediaries. However, the ongoing harmful effects on the average standard of working conditions being caused by these measures is seen critically not just by social actors representing workers, but also some citizens, who are warning of the dangers of growing social inequality, and the possibility of serious divisions in Spanish society as a result of greater precariousness and lack of social protection.

6. Legislative annex

Below is a legislative list of the main anti-crisis measures adopted during 2010-2011:

- RD-Law 8/2010, of 20 May, approving extraordinary measures to reduce the public deficit.
- RD-Law 10/2010, of 16 June, on urgent measures to reform the labour market.
- Law 35/2010, of 17 September, on urgent measures to reform the labour market.
- RD-Law 13/2010, of 3 December, on fiscal, employment and liberalisation actions to promote investment and job creation.
- RD-Law 1/2011, of 11 February, on urgent measures to promote the transition to stable employment and vocational retraining of unemployed people.
- RD-Law 2/2011, of 18 February, to reinforce the financial system.
- RD-Law 3/2011, of 18 February, on urgent measures to improve employability and reform active employment policies.
- Law 2/2011, of 4 March, on sustainable economy.
- Organic Law 4/2011, of 11 March, complementing the Law on sustainable economy.
- RD-Law 5/2011, of 29 April, on measures to regularise and control informal employment and promote the rehabilitation of housing.
- Law 10/2011, of 19 May, amending Law 10/1997, of 24 April, on the information and consultation rights of workers in Community-scale undertakings or groups of undertakings.
- Law 14/2011, of 1 June, on science, technology and innovation.
- RD-Law 7/2011, of 10 June, on urgent measures to reform collective bargaining.
- RD 801/2011, of 10 June, approving the Regulation on employment regulation procedures and administrative action in the field of collective transfers.
- RD-Law 8/2011, of 1 July, on measures to support mortgage holders, the control of public spending and the cancellation of debts owed to companies and self-employed workers contracted by local authorities, to stimulate business activity and to promote administrative simplification and reorganisation.
- Law 27/2011, of 1 August, on the updating, adaptation and modernisation of the social security system.
- RD-Law 10/2011, of 26 August, on urgent measures to promote the employment of young people, on promoting employment stability and on maintaining the vocational retraining programme for people no longer eligible for unemployment benefit.
- RD-Law 14/2011, of 16 September, on complementary measures relating to employment policies.
- Law 28/2011, of 22 September, incorporating the special agricultural social security scheme into the general social security system.
- Reform of Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution, of 27 September 2011.
- Law 36/2011, of 10 October, regulating labour courts.
- Law 37/2011, of 10 October, on the simplification of procedures.
- Law 38/2011, of 10 October, reforming Law 22/2003, of 9 July, on bankruptcy.
- RD-Law 16/2011, of 14 October, creating the credit institutions' deposit guarantee fund.
- RD 1542/2011, of 31 October, approving the Spanish Employment Strategy (2012-2014).
- RD 1620/2011, of 4 November, regulating the special labour relations in the case of domestic service.
- RD-Law 20/2011, of 30 December, on urgent budgetary, fiscal and financial measures to reduce the public deficit.

7. Statistical appendix

LABOUR FORCE SURVEY

LFS-18. Unemployed persons, by gender and age (1)

Thousands

YEARS (annual average)	TOTAL					MALE					FEMALE				
	Age Total	16-19	20-24	25-54	55 and above	Total	16-19	20-24	25-54	55 and above	Total	16-19	20-24	25-54	55 and above
2001.....	1 904.4	153.1	361.1	1 279.7	110.6	828.1	76.5	155.2	528.0	68.4	1 076.4	76.6	205.8	751.7	42.2
2002.....	2 155.3	151.2	391.1	1 483.4	129.7	929.4	80.8	176.1	595.8	76.6	1 226.0	70.4	215.0	887.6	53.1
2003.....	2 242.2	160.4	390.8	1 558.8	132.1	976.4	85.9	183.7	628.8	78.0	1 265.8	74.5	207.1	930.0	54.2
2004.....	2 213.6	147.9	382.4	1 543.7	139.7	970.8	80.4	176.4	633.1	81.0	1 242.9	67.5	206.0	910.6	58.7
2005.....	1 912.5	157.1	333.4	1 291.4	130.7	862.8	80.2	154.0	551.4	77.4	1 049.6	76.9	179.4	740.0	53.3
2006.....	1 837.1	156.9	286.5	1 267.1	126.7	791.5	75.4	130.2	515.0	70.8	1 045.6	81.5	156.2	752.0	55.8
2007.....	1 833.9	157.4	285.3	1 256.4	134.8	815.2	78.6	128.9	535.4	72.4	1 018.6	78.8	156.5	721.0	62.4
2008.....	2 590.6	211.1	381.9	1 818.4	179.3	1 311.0	110.8	204.6	895.4	100.1	1 279.6	100.3	177.3	922.9	79.2
2009.....	4 149.5	249.0	592.4	3 003.8	304.2	2 292.1	148.4	328.7	1 638.7	176.3	1 857.4	100.6	263.7	1 365.2	127.9
2010.....	4 632.4	236.8	615.2	3 416.2	364.2	2 529.3	136.0	342.2	1 825.0	226.0	2 103.1	100.8	273.0	1 591.2	138.1
2007:															
Q.-4.....	1 927.6	162.8	284.8	1 340.6	139.4	879.2	83.5	134.9	583.2	77.8	1 048.3	79.3	150.0	757.4	61.6
2008:															
Q.-1.....	2 174.2	170.5	329.6	1 517.0	157.2	1 018.6	89.0	166.8	678.3	84.5	1 155.6	81.5	162.8	838.7	72.6
Q.-2.....	2 381.5	222.5	351.5	1 643.0	164.6	1 182.9	109.5	184.5	792.7	96.2	1 198.6	113.0	166.9	850.4	68.4
Q.-3.....	2 598.8	227.6	385.5	1 812.3	173.4	1 353.6	120.4	210.5	923.0	99.6	1 245.2	107.1	175.0	889.3	73.8
Q.-4.....	3 207.9	223.9	461.0	2 301.1	221.9	1 688.8	124.4	256.7	1 187.8	120.0	1 519.0	99.5	204.4	1 113.3	101.9
2009:															
Q.-1.....	4 010.7	255.8	552.7	2 927.5	274.7	2 195.8	145.7	305.9	1 587.6	156.6	1 814.9	110.1	246.8	1 339.9	118.1
Q.-2.....	4 137.5	262.8	592.4	2 973.2	309.1	2 289.1	160.8	334.1	1 617.1	177.1	1 848.4	102.0	258.3	1 356.1	132.0
Q.-3.....	4 123.3	259.2	626.5	2 934.4	303.2	2 290.9	151.7	340.5	1 623.5	175.2	1 832.5	107.6	286.0	1 310.9	128.0
Q.-4.....	4 326.5	218.4	598.0	3 180.2	330.0	2 392.5	135.5	334.2	1 726.5	196.4	1 934.0	82.9	263.8	1 453.7	133.6

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2010:															
Q.-1.....	4 612.7	231.4	604.2	3 427.3	349.9	2 553.7	138.6	342.2	1 865.0	208.0	2 059.0	92.8	262.0	1 562.3	141.9
Q.-2.....	4 645.5	255.8	615.3	3 413.3	361.1	2 538.0	146.2	346.3	1 817.1	228.3	2 107.5	109.6	268.9	1 596.2	132.8
Q.-3.....	4 574.7	242.3	618.5	3 348.1	365.8	2 480.2	137.1	333.6	1 780.3	229.1	2 094.6	105.2	284.8	1 567.8	136.7
Q.-4.....	4 696.6	217.6	623.0	3 476.2	379.8	2 545.2	122.2	346.5	1 837.7	238.8	2 151.4	95.4	276.5	1 638.5	140.9
2011:															
Q.-1.....	4 910.2	214.6	652.6	3 662.3	380.6	2 635.0	122.7	359.2	1 923.3	229.8	2 275.2	91.9	293.4	1 739.1	150.8
Q.-2.....	4 833.7	219.0	667.6	3 567.4	379.7	2 608.1	123.9	364.5	1 888.5	231.3	2 225.6	95.1	303.1	1 678.9	148.4
Q.-3.....	4 978.3	236.1	681.8	3 655.3	405.1	2 674.0	135.4	362.9	1 937.3	238.4	2 304.4	100.7	318.9	1 718.0	166.7

(1) Figures adapted to the LFS-2005 methodology which, as of 2001, includes the new Community definition of unemployment. This leads to differences in the figures. See the General Notes and the note concerning this table in SOURCES AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

LABOUR FORCE SURVEY

LFS-19. Unemployment rates, by gender and age (1)

Percentage of the active population

YEARS (annual average)	TOTAL					MALE					FEMALE				
	Age Total	16-19	20-24	25-54	55 and above		16-19	20-24	25-54	55 and above	Total	16-19	20-24	25-54	55 and above
2001.....	10.6	29.2	18.8	9.2	6.2	7.6	23.7	14.5	6.4	5.4	15.2	37.8	24.4	13.7	8.0
2002.....	11.5	29.8	20.3	10.2	6.9	8.2	25.2	16.5	6.9	5.8	16.3	37.6	25.0	15.1	9.5
2003.....	11.5	32.7	20.2	10.3	6.7	8.4	28.0	17.1	7.1	5.7	16.0	40.6	24.1	14.9	9.0
2004.....	11.0	30.7	19.9	9.8	6.8	8.2	26.6	16.5	7.0	5.8	15.0	37.5	24.1	13.8	9.0
2005.....	9.1	29.2	17.1	8.0	5.9	7.0	24.6	14.3	5.9	5.2	12.2	36.4	20.4	10.9	7.2
2006.....	8.5	29.1	14.8	7.6	5.4	6.3	23.9	12.3	5.4	4.6	11.5	36.6	17.8	10.5	7.1
2007.....	8.3	28.8	15.1	7.2	5.6	6.4	23.9	12.5	5.4	4.6	10.8	36.1	18.3	9.7	7.4
2008.....	11.3	39.5	20.4	10.2	7.0	10.1	36.0	20.0	8.9	6.1	13.0	44.4	20.8	11.8	8.6
2009.....	18.0	55.4	33.4	16.6	11.5	17.7	55.0	34.6	16.3	10.8	18.4	56.1	32.1	16.9	12.7
2010.....	20.1	61.5	37.0	18.6	13.5	19.7	60.4	38.8	18.1	13.7	20.5	62.9	35.0	19.3	13.0
2007:															
Q.-4.....	8.6	31.3	15.3	7.6	5.7	6.8	26.9	13.3	5.9	4.9	11.0	37.9	17.7	10.0	7.1
2008:															
Q.-1.....	9.6	32.9	18.0	8.6	6.3	7.9	28.7	16.6	6.8	5.3	12.0	39.0	19.7	10.9	8.2
Q.-2.....	10.4	41.1	18.9	9.2	6.5	9.1	35.4	18.2	7.9	5.9	12.3	48.8	19.7	10.9	7.5
Q.-3.....	11.3	38.3	19.9	10.2	6.8	10.3	35.2	19.9	9.2	6.1	12.7	42.5	19.9	11.4	8.1
Q.-4.....	13.9	45.8	24.8	12.7	8.5	13.0	44.6	25.5	11.8	7.3	15.1	47.4	24.0	13.9	10.6
2009:															
Q.-1.....	17.4	54.5	30.7	16.1	10.5	16.9	52.9	31.5	15.7	9.6	18.0	56.7	29.9	16.6	12.0
Q.-2.....	17.9	56.3	33.4	16.4	11.6	17.6	56.8	34.9	16.0	10.8	18.3	55.6	31.6	16.8	13.0
Q.-3.....	17.9	53.4	34.7	16.2	11.6	17.8	53.2	35.3	16.2	10.9	18.2	53.6	33.9	16.3	12.7
Q.-4.....	18.8	57.6	35.0	17.5	12.4	18.6	57.1	36.8	17.2	12.0	19.1	58.4	32.9	17.8	13.0
2010:															
Q.-1.....	20.1	59.8	36.5	18.7	13.1	20.0	59.4	39.1	18.5	12.8	20.2	60.4	33.6	19.0	13.5

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Q.-2.....	20.1	62.3	37.1	18.6	13.4	19.7	60.9	38.8	18.0	13.8	20.6	64.3	35.1	19.3	12.8
Q.-3.....	19.8	59.9	36.2	18.3	13.5	19.3	58.8	37.0	17.7	13.8	20.4	61.5	35.2	19.1	12.9
Q.-4.....	20.3	63.8	38.4	18.9	13.8	20.0	62.6	40.3	18.3	14.5	20.8	65.5	36.2	19.6	12.8
2011:															
Q.-1.....	21.3	65.1	41.3	19.9	13.8	20.8	63.9	43.4	19.2	13.9	21.9	66.8	38.9	20.8	13.5
Q.-2.....	20.9	62.6	42.5	19.4	13.5	20.6	64.0	44.4	18.9	14.0	21.3	60.8	40.3	20.0	12.8
Q.-3.....	21.5	60.5	42.3	20.0	14.3	21.0	61.2	43.4	19.4	14.4	22.1	59.5	41.2	20.7	14.1

(1) Figures brought into line with the LFS-2005 methodology which, as of 2001, includes the new Community definition of unemployment. This accounts for differences in the figures. See the General Notes in SOURCES AND EXPLANATORY NOTES.

LABOUR FORCE SURVEY

LFS-20 Number of persons unemployed, by sector of the economy (1)

Thousands

YEARS (annual average)	TOTAL	AGRICULTUR E	NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTORS				NOT CLASSIFIABLE (2)
			Total	Industry	Construction	Services	
1999.....	2 722.2	215.7	1 362.4	238.8	201.8	921.8	1 144.2
2000.....	2 496.4	216.3	1 326.1	223.3	197.6	905.1	954.0
2001.....	1 904.4	162.0	1 139.2	206.1	179.1	754.0	603.2
2002.....	2 155.3	179.2	1 342.5	239.5	209.2	893.9	633.6
2003.....	2 242.2	181.4	1 417.3	254.5	210.7	952.0	643.5
2004.....	2 213.6	178.7	1 429.3	247.4	209.2	972.7	605.6
2005.....	1 912.5	107.5	987.0	161.2	151.9	673.8	818.0
2006.....	1 837.1	90.7	1 014.7	146.2	161.7	706.8	731.7
2007.....	1 833.9	96.9	1 032.7	135.6	183.4	713.7	704.3
2008.....	2 590.6	137.6	1 590.9	213.6	418.6	953.5	867.4
2005:							
Q.-1.....	2 099.0	108.0	1 121.2	180.0	169.3	771.9	869.8
Q.-2.....	1 944.7	110.7	982.2	165.0	147.0	670.2	851.8
Q.-3.....	1 765.0	112.0	880.1	146.1	139.5	594.6	772.9
Q.-4.....	1 841.3	99.2	964.7	153.9	151.9	658.7	777.4
2006:							
Q.-1.....	1 935.8	95.0	1 106.4	162.7	179.2	764.5	734.4
Q.-2.....	1 837.0	96.2	1 004.9	140.5	160.1	704.3	735.9
Q.-3.....	1 765.0	90.3	943.1	138.6	151.2	653.3	731.6
Q.-4.....	1 810.6	81.4	1 004.3	143.1	156.2	704.9	724.9
2007:							
Q.-1.....	1 856.1	74.1	1 045.8	148.1	174.6	723.2	736.2
Q.-2.....	1 760.0	88.0	964.2	122.1	164.1	678.1	707.8
Q.-3.....	1 791.9	105.1	1 014.9	135.4	177.2	702.3	671.9
Q.-4.....	1 927.6	120.3	1 105.9	136.9	217.7	751.3	701.4

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2008:								
Q.-1.....	2 174.2	118.0	1 305.0	164.7	288.8	847.6	755.0	
Q.-2.....	2 381.5	125.0	1 451.5	185.0	375.7	886.8	809.1	
Q.-3.....	2 598.8	151.9	1 586.8	212.2	433.3	934.5	866.9	
Q.-4.....	3 207.9	155.3	2 020.4	292.4	576.6	1 145.2	1 038.4	

(1) Figures brought into line with the LFS-2005 methodology which, as of 2001, includes the new Community definition of unemployment. This accounts for differences in the figures. See the General Notes in SOURCES AND EXPLANATORY NOTES.

(2) See the note concerning this table in SOURCES AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

Standard Industrial Classification for 2009 and subsequent years can be consulted in our main publications.

LABOUR FORCE SURVEY

LFS-21 Unemployment rates by sector (1)

Percentage of the active population

YEARS (annual average)	TOTAL	AGRICULTURE	NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTORS			
			Total	Industry	Construction	Services
1999.....	15.7	17.0	9.1	7.4	11.4	9.2
2000.....	13.8	17.4	8.4	6.8	10.3	8.6
2001.....	10.6	13.4	7.0	6.1	8.7	7.0
2002.....	11.5	15.3	7.9	7.0	9.5	7.8
2003.....	11.5	15.5	8.0	7.4	9.1	8.0
2004.....	11.0	15.3	7.8	7.2	8.5	7.8
2005.....	9.1	9.7	5.2	4.7	6.1	5.2
2006.....	8.5	8.8	5.1	4.2	6.0	5.2
2007.....	8.3	9.5	5.1	4.0	6.3	5.0
2008.....	11.3	13.5	7.6	6.2	14.9	6.5
2005:						

Q.-1.....	10.2	9.6	6.0	5.2	6.9	6.1
Q.-2.....	9.3	10.1	5.2	4.8	5.9	5.2
Q.-3.....	8.4	10.1	4.6	4.2	5.5	4.5
Q.-4.....	8.7	9.0	5.0	4.5	5.9	5.0
2006:						
Q.-1.....	9.1	8.8	5.7	4.7	6.9	5.7
Q.-2.....	8.5	9.1	5.1	4.1	6.0	5.2
Q.-3.....	8.2	9.0	4.7	4.0	5.5	4.7
Q.-4.....	8.3	8.1	5.0	4.1	5.6	5.1
2007:						
Q.-1.....	8.5	7.0	5.2	4.3	6.1	5.2
Q.-2.....	8.0	8.7	4.7	3.6	5.7	4.8
Q.-3.....	8.0	10.6	4.9	4.0	6.1	4.9
Q.-4.....	8.6	11.7	5.4	4.0	7.5	5.2
2008:						
Q.-1.....	9.6	11.3	6.3	4.7	9.9	5.9
Q.-2.....	10.4	12.4	6.9	5.3	13.1	6.0
Q.-3.....	11.3	15.2	7.5	6.2	15.5	6.3
Q.-4.....	13.9	15.2	9.6	8.7	21.3	7.7

(1) Figures brought into line with the LFS-2005 methodology which, as of 2001, includes the new Community definition of unemployment. This accounts for differences in the figures.

(2) See the General Notes and the note concerning this table in SOURCES AND EXPLANATORY NOTES.

Data from the Standard Industrial Classification for 2009 and subsequent years can be consulted in our main publications.

LABOUR FORCE SURVEY

LFS-22 Unemployment persons, by gender and length of time job-seeking (1)

Percentage breakdown

YEARS (annual average)	TOTAL							MALE							FEMALE						
	Total	Less than 1 month	Between 1 and 3 months	Between 3 and 6 months	Between 6 months and 1 year	Between 1 and 2 years	2 years and above	Total	Less than 1 month	Between 1 and 3 months	Between 3 and 6 months	Between 6 months and 1 year	Between 1 and 2 years	2 years and above	Total	Less than 1 month	Between 1 and 3 months	Between 3 and 6 months	Between 6 months and 1 year	Between 1 and 2 years	2 years and above
2001.....	100	5.9	15.8	16.8	18.0	17.0	26.4	100	7.3	18.5	18.8	18.2	16.4	21.0	100	5.0	13.8	15.4	17.8	17.5	30.5
2002.....	100	5.6	17.8	18.0	19.1	16.5	23.2	100	6.8	21.0	19.5	18.7	15.6	18.3	100	4.6	15.3	16.8	19.4	17.2	26.8
2003.....	100	5.6	17.6	17.6	19.8	17.0	22.3	100	6.4	20.2	19.1	20.3	16.1	18.0	100	5.1	15.6	16.5	19.5	17.7	25.5
2004.....	100	5.3	18.3	18.4	20.3	16.4	21.2	100	6.0	20.6	19.5	20.6	15.5	17.8	100	4.7	16.5	17.6	20.1	17.2	23.8
2005.....	100	11.8	23.8	16.8	15.0	15.1	17.5	100	13.4	25.4	18.2	14.7	13.6	14.6	100	10.5	22.4	15.7	15.4	16.2	19.8
2006.....	100	13.7	25.4	16.5	14.9	14.6	14.9	100	15.4	26.8	17.6	14.4	13.5	12.3	100	12.5	24.3	15.7	15.2	15.4	16.8
2007.....	100	14.4	25.9	17.1	15.0	13.4	14.2	100	16.3	28.1	17.2	14.4	12.2	11.8	100	12.9	24.2	17.0	15.4	14.3	16.2
2008.....	100	12.3	27.7	19.7	16.4	12.8	11.1	100	14.0	30.0	20.8	16.3	11.2	7.7	100	10.7	25.4	18.6	16.4	14.3	14.6
2009.....	100	7.2	19.2	20.4	23.0	19.0	11.1	100	7.6	19.6	21.4	24.8	18.7	8.0	100	6.9	18.8	19.2	20.8	19.4	14.9
2010.....	100	5.3	14.7	14.5	20.3	27.1	17.9	100	5.5	14.2	14.7	21.0	29.0	15.6	100	5.2	15.4	14.3	19.5	24.8	20.7
2007: Q.-4....	100	13.6	28.2	18.1	14.0	12.9	13.2	100	15.5	29.5	20.1	13.5	11.1	10.3	100	12.0	27.1	16.5	14.4	14.4	15.5
2008: Q.-1....	100	12.8	28.0	18.6	15.4	13.0	12.3	100	15.3	29.8	19.1	15.6	10.7	9.5	100	10.6	26.3	18.2	15.2	14.9	14.7
Q.-2....	100	12.3	27.0	20.5	16.6	11.8	11.9	100	14.4	30.2	21.0	16.1	10.2	8.1	100	10.2	23.8	20.0	17.0	13.4	15.6
Q.-3....	100	13.1	28.1	18.7	16.8	12.9	10.4	100	14.0	30.0	20.5	17.0	11.7	6.8	100	12.2	25.9	16.6	16.5	14.2	14.5
Q.-4....	100	11.2	27.7	21.1	16.8	13.4	9.8	100	12.3	29.8	22.6	16.7	12.1	6.6	100	10.0	25.4	19.4	17.0	14.8	13.5
2009: Q.-1....	100	8.2	23.4	23.5	20.6	14.5	9.9	100	8.9	24.9	23.9	21.8	13.4	7.1	100	7.3	21.6	22.9	19.1	15.8	13.4
Q.-2....	100	6.5	18.2	22.5	24.7	17.1	11.0	100	6.9	18.4	24.1	26.9	16.5	7.3	100	6.1	17.9	20.5	22.1	17.8	15.6
Q.-3....	100	7.3	18.2	18.2	24.6	20.6	11.1	100	7.5	17.8	19.7	26.6	20.2	8.2	100	7.0	18.7	16.3	22.1	21.1	14.9
Q.-4....	100	7.0	17.1	17.4	22.1	24.0	12.4	100	6.9	17.2	17.7	23.9	24.8	9.5	100	7.1	16.9	17.0	19.9	23.1	15.9
2010: Q.-1....	100	5.2	16.0	16.0	22.2	26.4	14.2	100	5.4	16.1	16.2	23.6	27.0	11.6	100	5.0	15.9	15.6	20.4	25.8	17.3

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Q.-2....	100	5.4	13.2	15.8	20.6	28.1	16.9	100	5.2	13.2	16.1	21.0	30.4	14.1	100	5.6	13.2	15.4	20.1	25.4	20.3
Q.-3....	100	5.4	15.0	12.6	20.7	26.6	19.6	100	5.6	13.5	12.6	21.5	29.1	17.7	100	5.3	16.8	12.7	19.8	23.8	21.8
Q.-4....	100	5.3	14.8	13.7	17.8	27.3	21.1	100	5.6	13.8	14.0	17.7	29.7	19.1	100	5.0	15.9	13.4	17.8	24.4	23.5
2011:																					
Q.-1....	100	5.1	13.5	14.4	17.8	26.0	23.2	100	5.4	13.6	14.1	17.8	27.7	21.4	100	4.9	13.4	14.6	17.8	24.1	25.2
Q.-2....	100	5.2	11.8	14.0	18.4	24.6	25.9	100	5.3	12.1	14.5	18.5	25.2	24.3	100	5.1	11.5	13.5	18.3	23.9	27.7
Q.-3....	100	5.4	13.5	12.2	17.5	24.7	26.7	100	5.5	13.6	11.9	18.5	24.6	25.8	100	5.2	13.4	12.4	16.4	24.8	27.8

(1) For the purpose of calculating the percentage breakdown, unemployed persons who have already found work are not included. Figures brought into line with the LFS-2005 methodology which, as of 2001, includes the new Community definition of unemployment. This accounts for differences in the figures
See the General Notes in SOURCES AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

LABOUR FORCE SURVEY

LFS-24 Unemployed persons under the age of 25, by gender and length of time job-hunting

Percentage breakdown

YEARS (annual average)	TOTAL							MALE							FEMALE						
	Total	Less than 1 month	Between 1 and 3 months	Between 3 and 6 months	Between 6 months and 1 year	Between 1 and 2 years	2 years And above	Total	Less than 1 month	Between 1 and 3 months	Between 3 and 6 months	Between 6 months and 1 year	Between 1 and 2 years	2 years and above	Total	Less than 1 month	Between 1 and 3 months	Between 3 and 6 months	Between 6 months and 1 year	Between 1 and 2 years	2 years and above
2001.....	100	8.0	19.3	20.6	20.3	17.0	14.8	100	9.2	21.6	22.3	19.9	15.6	11.4	100	7.0	17.5	19.1	20.5	18.2	17.6
2002.....	100	7.2	21.5	21.5	21.0	15.6	13.2	100	8.0	23.2	21.9	21.1	15.0	10.9	100	6.6	20.0	21.2	21.0	16.2	15.1
2003.....	100	7.5	21.7	20.0	21.0	16.0	13.7	100	7.6	23.5	20.2	21.0	15.0	12.7	100	7.4	20.1	19.9	21.0	17.0	14.6
2004.....	100	7.9	22.6	21.2	21.2	14.7	12.4	100	8.7	22.9	22.0	21.8	13.8	11.0	100	7.1	22.2	20.6	20.8	15.6	13.8
2005.....	100	16.4	30.5	17.8	15.4	12.5	7.4	100	18.8	30.8	18.6	13.9	11.0	6.9	100	14.3	30.2	17.2	16.6	13.7	7.9
2006.....	100	19.1	31.0	18.0	13.9	12.4	5.4	100	20.9	31.8	18.4	12.9	10.8	5.2	100	17.6	30.4	17.7	14.8	13.9	5.6
2007.....	100	19.9	31.0	18.8	14.5	10.3	5.5	100	22.3	32.7	18.2	13.7	8.6	4.4	100	17.8	29.5	19.2	15.2	11.9	6.4
2008.....	100	15.5	32.4	20.1	15.9	11.6	4.5	100	15.9	34.5	19.6	15.6	10.8	3.6	100	15.0	30.2	20.6	16.3	12.4	5.5
2009.....	100	9.0	21.5	21.6	23.3	18.2	6.4	100	8.4	20.2	22.3	24.8	18.2	6.1	100	9.8	23.2	20.6	21.4	18.3	6.7
2010.....	100	7.0	18.9	16.8	20.3	26.0	11.0	100	6.1	17.1	15.9	21.2	28.2	11.4	100	8.0	21.3	18.0	19.1	23.2	10.4
2007: Q.-4.....	100	19.3	32.2	18.8	12.7	11.5	5.4	100	22.1	33.3	19.8	11.8	8.9	4.0	100	16.6	31.3	17.9	13.5	13.9	6.7
2008: Q.-1.....	100	14.3	34.2	18.8	15.2	12.1	5.4	100	16.5	37.3	16.8	15.6	9.5	4.4	100	12.0	30.9	21.0	14.7	14.8	6.6
Q.-2.....	100	16.8	30.7	21.4	16.5	10.4	4.2	100	16.8	33.9	20.0	17.2	9.2	2.9	100	16.8	27.3	22.9	15.7	11.7	5.6
Q.-3.....	100	18.9	33.4	17.1	15.4	11.1	4.2	100	18.8	33.9	18.5	15.0	10.5	3.3	100	19.1	32.7	15.3	15.8	11.8	5.3
Q.-4.....	100	11.8	31.5	23.2	16.4	12.8	4.2	100	11.6	32.8	23.3	14.4	14.0	3.9	100	12.1	29.9	23.1	19.0	11.2	4.5
2009: Q.-1.....	100	9.6	23.2	24.5	23.5	13.7	5.6	100	9.7	22.5	23.9	24.3	13.8	5.8	100	9.4	24.0	25.3	22.4	13.7	5.2
Q.-2.....	100	7.9	19.4	23.4	25.5	17.1	6.8	100	7.5	18.6	24.8	26.6	15.9	6.5	100	8.5	20.4	21.4	23.8	18.7	7.1
Q.-3.....	100	10.8	23.4	19.1	22.4	18.6	5.7	100	9.9	19.9	20.5	24.9	19.6	5.3	100	12.0	27.9	17.4	19.1	17.4	6.2
Q.-4.....	100	7.7	20.0	19.3	22.0	23.5	7.5	100	6.6	19.6	20.0	23.5	23.5	7.0	100	9.2	20.7	18.3	20.1	23.6	8.1
2010: Q.-1.....	100	5.9	16.9	19.7	23.2	25.4	8.9	100	5.2	16.4	18.3	25.2	25.9	8.9	100	6.9	17.6	21.5	20.5	24.7	8.9

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Q.-2.....	100	7.9	17.4	16.0	20.3	28.2	10.2	100	6.6	15.8	15.8	21.7	29.6	10.5	100	9.6	19.5	16.4	18.4	26.3	9.8
Q.-3.....	100	7.8	23.7	13.6	18.6	24.6	11.7	100	6.7	20.1	12.3	19.9	28.8	12.2	100	9.1	28.1	15.1	16.9	19.5	11.2
Q.-4.....	100	6.2	17.7	18.1	19.2	25.7	13.1	100	6.0	16.0	17.3	18.1	28.5	14.2	100	6.4	20.0	19.1	20.6	22.1	11.7
2011:																					
Q.-1.....	100	5.8	15.6	16.8	21.5	25.3	15.0	100	5.6	14.4	16.1	21.0	27.0	16.0	100	6.1	17.2	17.6	22.2	23.2	13.7
Q.-2.....	100	8.4	13.8	15.0	21.6	23.9	17.2	100	7.9	13.3	15.0	21.3	24.3	18.3	100	9.0	14.5	15.2	22.0	23.6	15.8
Q.-3.....	100	7.2	20.5	12.9	18.0	24.4	17.1	100	6.8	18.7	11.9	18.6	25.2	18.8	100	7.7	22.7	14.2	17.2	23.4	14.9

(1) Figures brought into line with the LFS-2005 methodology which, as of 2001, includes the new Community definition of unemployment. This leads to differences in the figures. See the General Notes in SOURCES AND EXPLANATORY NOTES.

EMPLOYMENT STATUS SURVEY

ESS-1 Workforce by gender and contract type

Thousands

YEARS (annual average)	TOTAL			MALE			FEMALE		
	Total	Permanent contract	Temporary contract	Total	Permanent contract	Temporary contract	Total	Permanent contract	Temporary contract
2001.....	10 665.0	6 858.4	3 806.7	6 667.9	4 288.8	2 379.1	3 997.2	2 569.6	1 427.6
2002.....	11 010.4	7 127.8	3 882.6	6 800.7	4 414.4	2 386.3	4 209.8	2 713.4	1 496.4
2003.....	11 347.8	7 397.2	3 950.6	6 948.0	4 532.4	2 415.6	4 399.8	2 864.8	1 535.0
2004.....	11 736.1	7 676.3	4 059.8	7 110.5	4 640.8	2 469.7	4 625.5	3 035.4	1 590.1
2005.....	12 337.9	8 021.6	4 316.3	7 407.2	4 795.0	2 612.2	4 930.7	3 226.6	1 704.2
2006.....	12 990.5	8 546.8	4 443.7	7 720.4	5 054.5	2 665.8	5 270.2	3 492.3	1 777.9
2007.....	13 607.5	9 226.5	4 381.0	7 945.8	5 370.0	2 575.8	5 661.7	3 856.5	1 805.2
2008.....	13 212.1	9 269.4	3 942.7	7 497.6	5 303.4	2 194.2	5 714.5	3 966.0	1 748.5
2009.....	12 192.6	9 023.8	3 168.8	6 697.7	5 022.5	1 675.1	5 494.8	4 001.2	1 493.6
2010.....	11 898.9	8 865.8	3 033.1	6 443.6	4 858.7	1 584.9	5 455.4	4 007.2	1 448.2
2007:									
Q.-4.....	13 557.3	9 301.0	4 256.3	7 821.0	5 379.4	2 441.6	5 736.4	3 921.6	1 814.7
2008:									
Q.-1.....	13 563.4	9 300.6	4 262.8	7 780.9	5 326.7	2 454.1	5 782.6	3 973.8	1 808.7
Q.-2.....	13 488.8	9 251.5	4 237.3	7 730.3	5 328.6	2 401.7	5 758.5	3 922.8	1 835.6
Q.-3.....	13 166.2	9 314.8	3 851.4	7 485.9	5 339.7	2 146.2	5 680.3	3 975.1	1 705.2
Q.-4.....	12 630.1	9 210.8	3 419.2	6 993.4	5 218.5	1 774.9	5 636.7	3 992.4	1 644.4
2009:									
Q.-1.....	12 353.9	9 163.0	3 190.9	6 818.7	5 137.1	1 681.6	5 535.2	4 025.9	1 509.3
Q.-2.....	12 279.5	9 001.3	3 278.3	6 797.7	5 026.9	1 770.8	5 481.8	3 974.4	1 507.5
Q.-3.....	12 161.0	8 979.6	3 181.4	6 692.2	4 984.3	1 707.8	5 468.8	3 995.2	1 473.6
Q.-4.....	11 975.8	8 951.3	3 024.5	6 482.2	4 941.9	1 540.3	5 493.6	4 009.5	1 484.2

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2010:

Q.-1.....	11 861.1	8 875.3	2 985.9	6 399.4	4 862.3	1 537.1	5 461.7	4 013.0	1 448.8
Q.-2.....	11 969.6	8 815.5	3 154.1	6 556.5	4 867.7	1 688.8	5 413.1	3 947.8	1 465.2
Q.-3.....	11 944.0	8 903.6	3 040.3	6 495.0	4 874.4	1 620.6	5 449.0	4 029.3	1 419.7
Q.-4.....	11 821.1	8 868.9	2 952.1	6 323.3	4 830.3	1 493.0	5 497.7	4 038.6	1 459.1

2011:

Q.-1.....	11 742.9	8 800.6	2 942.4	6 308.4	4 785.8	1 522.5	5 434.5	4 014.7	1 419.8
Q.-2.....	11 746.6	8 763.3	2 983.3	6 355.3	4 774.0	1 581.3	5 391.3	3 989.3	1 402.0
Q.-3.....	11 660.4	8 782.3	2 878.1	6 234.5	4 759.7	1 474.8	5 425.9	4 022.6	1 403.3

EMPLOYMENT STATUS SURVEY

ESS-2 Workforce by gender and contract type

Thousands

AGE (annual average)	TOTAL			MALE			FEMALE		
	Total	Full- time	Part- time	Total	Full- time	Part- time	Total	Full- time	Part- time
2001.....	10 665.0	9 280.0	1 385.0	6 667.9	6 220.9	446.9	3 997.2	3 059.1	938.1
2002.....	11 010.4	9 489.2	1 521.3	6 800.7	6 326.8	473.9	4 209.8	3 162.3	1 047.4
2003.....	11 347.8	9 719.4	1 628.4	6 948.0	6 463.9	484.1	4 399.8	3 255.5	1 144.3
2004.....	11 736.1	9 988.4	1 747.6	7 110.5	6 589.9	520.6	4 625.5	3 398.5	1 227.0
2005.....	12 337.9	10 439.6	1 898.3	7 407.2	6 850.1	557.1	4 930.7	3 589.5	1 341.3
2006.....	12 990.5	10 982.5	2 008.0	7 720.4	7 151.8	568.6	5 270.2	3 830.8	1 439.4
2007.....	13 607.5	11 420.9	2 186.6	7 945.8	7 335.0	610.8	5 661.7	4 085.9	1 575.8
2008.....	13 212.1	10 983.0	2 229.1	7 497.6	6 864.5	633.1	5 714.5	4 118.5	1 596.0
2009.....	12 192.6	9 921.0	2 271.6	6 697.7	6 042.2	655.4	5 494.8	3 878.8	1 616.1
2010.....	11 898.9	9 517.3	2 381.6	6 443.6	5 745.3	698.3	5 455.4	3 772.0	1 683.3
2007:									
Q.-4.....	13 557.3	11 297.4	2 259.9	7 821.0	7 185.5	635.5	5 736.4	4 111.9	1 624.4
2008:									
Q.-1.....	13 563.4	11 270.4	2 293.0	7 780.9	7 135.2	645.6	5 782.6	4 135.1	1 647.4
Q.-2.....	13 488.8	11 266.4	2 222.4	7 730.3	7 092.9	637.4	5 758.5	4 173.5	1 584.9
Q.-3.....	13 166.2	11 021.8	2 144.4	7 485.9	6 869.6	616.3	5 680.3	4 152.2	1 528.0
Q.-4.....	12 630.1	10 373.4	2 256.7	6 993.4	6 360.3	633.1	5 636.7	4 013.1	1 623.6
2009:									
Q.-1.....	12 353.9	10 064.4	2 289.5	6 818.7	6 184.9	633.7	5 535.2	3 879.5	1 655.7
Q.-2.....	12 279.5	10 064.0	2 215.6	6 797.7	6 148.6	649.1	5 481.8	3 915.4	1 566.4
Q.-3.....	12 161.0	9 921.8	2 239.2	6 692.2	6 028.0	664.1	5 468.8	3 893.7	1 575.1
Q.-4.....	11 975.8	9 633.8	2 342.1	6 482.2	5 807.3	674.9	5 493.6	3 826.5	1 667.1

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2010:									
Q.-1.....	11 861.1	9 460.5	2 400.6	6 399.4	5 713.2	686.2	5 461.7	3 747.3	1 714.4
Q.-2.....	11 969.6	9 648.0	2 321.6	6 556.5	5 850.5	706.1	5 413.1	3 797.5	1 615.5
Q.-3.....	11 944.0	9 588.5	2 355.5	6 495.0	5 798.4	696.5	5 449.0	3 790.1	1 658.9
Q.-4.....	11 821.1	9 372.3	2 448.8	6 323.3	5 619.0	704.3	5 497.7	3 753.3	1 744.5
2011:									
Q.-1.....	11 742.9	9 247.4	2 495.5	6 308.4	5 584.5	723.8	5 434.5	3 662.9	1 771.7
Q.-2.....	11 746.6	9 318.3	2 428.3	6 355.3	5 618.2	737.1	5 391.3	3 700.1	1 691.2
Q.-3.....	11 660.4	9 235.0	2 425.4	6 234.5	5 527.0	707.5	5 425.9	3 708.0	1 717.9

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS

UB-15. Initial registrations of tax benefit recipients, by grounds for entitlement (1)

YEARS	TOTAL	TERMINATION BY DISMISSAL				EMPLOYMENT REGULATION CASES		End of temporary contract	Other grounds
		Dismissal under the terms of Law 45/2002	On objective grounds	Record of settlement and completion of probationary period	Ruling by employment tribunal	Post eliminated	Suspension and partial unemployment		
2001.....	1 091 110	-	49 965	175 958	15 783	33 400	16 462	791 412	8 130
2002.....	1 237 311	90 743	63 016	141 140	16 217	37 307	24 445	855 624	8 819
2003.....	1 291 581	226 208	54 009	58 151	8 837	39 349	16 835	880 008	8 184
2004.....	1 337 370	275 969	48 124	48 600	8 543	31 942	11 546	904 830	7 816
2005.....	1 365 145	304 452	46 299	44 733	9 459	31 316	15 367	905 717	7 802
2006.....	1 431 499	352 769	41 770	39 245	8 353	27 788	8 244	944 537	8 793
2007.....	1 561 767	410 785	40 006	36 588	6 795	28 709	16 259	1 013 043	9 582
2008.....	2 236 753	627 645	85 718	45 454	9 466	37 781	40 405	1 379 358	10 926
2009.....	2 557 901	676 596	144 508	36 135	17 778	75 610	379 062	1 213 536	14 676
2010.....	1 935 370	505 898	139 177	24 989	18 949	70 373	180 409	980 607	14 968
2010:									
(JAN-NOV).....	1 792 321	470 614	126 305	23 220	17 713	65 497	167 111	907 968	13 893
2011:									
(JAN-NOV).....	1 759 476	410 247	171 647	18 851	13 428	71 652	149 863	906 405	17 383
2010									
JUN.....	160 055	38 756	9 947	1 960	1 804	5 282	15 406	85 802	1 098
JUL.....	178 718	39 660	11 192	2 198	1 577	5 744	10 859	106 194	1 294
AUG.....	136 961	35 638	10 361	1 693	1 222	6 782	8 719	71 416	1 130
SEP.....	156 048	38 760	11 063	1 858	1 263	5 045	12 500	84 466	1 093
OCT.....	169 541	41 183	12 445	1 795	1 351	4 680	10 652	96 254	1 181


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NOV.....	173 591	42 766	14 370	2 181	1 658	5 141	10 657	95 526	1 292
DEC.....	143 049	35 284	12 872	1 769	1 236	4 876	13 298	72 639	1 075
2011:									
JAN.....	174 341	43 130	16 704	1 744	1 448	6 502	16 142	87 211	1 460
FEB.....	152 310	41 397	16 246	1 838	1 659	6 594	17 939	65 448	1 189
MAR.....	146 093	40 199	16 154	1 973	1 635	6 359	12 394	65 968	1 411
APR.....	129 961	34 452	13 819	1 613	1 280	7 048	12 410	58 125	1 214
MAY.....	135 191	34 043	13 265	1 743	1 417	5 985	13 327	64 281	1 130
JUN.....	164 068	34 355	13 973	1 674	1 172	6 582	11 599	91 741	2 972
JUL.....	175 617	34 669	14 430	1 731	1 079	6 656	10 670	104 582	1 800
AUG.....	144 662	32 709	14 260	1 629	838	7 198	9 809	76 755	1 464
SEP.....	158 117	35 601	14 428	1 513	898	6 166	11 322	86 779	1 410
OCT.....	180 790	39 950	18 268	1 662	978	6 205	12 282	99 897	1 548
NOV.....	198 326	39 742	20 100	1 731	1 024	6 357	21 969	105 618	1 785

GRAPHS


Registered unemployed in Spain 2007-2011

Paro registrado en España 2007 - 2011




Workers registered with the Social Security Department (2007-2011)

TRABAJADORES DE ALTA EN LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL (2007 - 2011)



Trends in permanent contracts 2007-2011

Evolución contratos indefinidos 2007-2011




Trends in temporary contracts 2007-2011

Evolución contratos temporales 2007-2011.




Recipients of unemployment benefits

Beneficiarios del sistema de desempleo (2007-2011)



Uneven distribution of the unemployment rate in Spain (2011)

Distribución irregular de la tasa de paro en España (2011)



Comparison of Spain's unemployment rate with that of other European countries as of January 2011

Comparativa de la tasa de paro de España con otros países europeos a enero 2011

